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On 18 October 1926, an eighteen-year-old student, Simone de Beauvoir, took the bus across 
Paris to attend an uninspiring Greek language class. On this particular journey, she passed the 
time by reading – not the works of philosophy in which this model student was beginning to 
immerse herself, but rather poetry. That night she noted in her diary: ‘Lu du Laforgue. 
Intense émotion. Jamais rien rencontré d’aussi profondément déchirant’ (2008: 134). 
Beauvoir’s encounter with Laforgue’s verse produced in her ‘un universel attendrissement’ 
(2008: 150) that was hard to contain. Indeed, she later registered surprise at her capacity to 
cry over his poems as she lingered awkwardly by the bouquinistes on the Seine (2008: 189).1 
Laforgue’s characteristic pessimism seemed to chime with Beauvoir’s persistent melancholy 
that autumn. ‘Oh! la vie est trop triste, incurablement triste…’ was one of the many lines of 
Laforgue’s verse that she copied out in her diary and read back to herself (‘Soir de carnaval’; 
cited by Beauvoir, 2008: 132). Beauvoir was in love – or, at least, contemplating being in 
love – with her well-to-do nineteen-year-old cousin Jacques; and it is largely in connection 
with her fraught reflections on this relationship, and in particular on the prospect of marriage, 
that Laforgue’s verse is cited, his own rendering of the female lover’s discourse providing 
Beauvoir with the language in which to voice her own tentatively amorous sentiment: ‘Ces 
mots qu’Elle lui dit, je les ai dits moi aussi, […] il y a des jours où j’ai dit exactement ces 
mots-là’ (2008: 175). 
 Laforgue seemed to capture something of the young student’s emotional turmoil in 
those months before her first encounter with Sartre and, eventually, the lifelong relationship 
that would render her uncertain feelings for Jacques something of a sentimental fausse piste. 
  
Curiously, Sartre too was prone to react emotionally to Laforgue and later recalled shedding 
‘des torrents de larmes’ on rereading his verse (Bertholet, 2000: 84). Capable of reducing 
both individuals to tears, we might wonder why Laforgue’s writing exerted such a pull both 
on the imagination and on the heartstrings of the existentialist intellectual.2 Before we rush to 
explain away Beauvoir’s deeply affective response to Laforgue’s poetry as the manifestation 
of adolescent angst, we might recall that it is the poet’s assessment of gender relations that, 
some twenty-three years later, Beauvoir would cite at the head of her conclusion to the 
second volume of Le Deuxième Sexe (1949), having already invoked Laforgue – his notes, 
novellas, and verse – at earlier junctures (1976, I: 306-07, 405-06). It is the nature of these 
references to Laforgue that I wish to reflect on in this article, with a view to reexamining the 
poet’s writing on women. In returning to Laforgue’s poetry and notes via Beauvoir – that is, 
via both her intimate first reading and her later handling of his thought in her feminist 
philosophy – I want to explore the irony and the ideals that underpinned his account of sexual 
difference, and which have together rendered the poet something of a contradiction in terms 
in much critical discourse: while Clive Scott describes Laforgue as ‘intermittently sexist’ 
(1990: 235), for Mireille Dottin-Orsini, Laforgue’s admixture of contempt and compassion 
towards women make of him a ‘misogyne féministe’ (Dottin-Orsini, in Laforgue, 1986-2000, 
III: 1073; hereafter OC).  
Beauvoir makes numerous, often extensive, allusions to a range of nineteenth-century 
literature over the two volumes of Le Deuxième Sexe, including many women authors (such 
as Staël, Stern, Tristan, Sand, Bashkirtseff). But from her cast of male writers, it is Stendhal 
who stands out, as the subject of an individual essay, ‘Stendhal ou le romanesque du vrai’. 
Stendhal represents, as Maria Scott puts it, ‘an exception to the rule’ among male authors 
insofar as ‘his heroines depart from the usual myths of femininity by resembling flesh-and-
blood women’ (2013: 1-2). According to Beauvoir, this ‘tendre ami des femmes’ (1976, I: 
  
377) depicted woman as a subject in her own right, and rejected precisely the sort of 
essentialism, or ‘l’Éternel Féminin’, to which Laforgue insistently, though not uncritically, 
returned (‘Notre petite compagne’, Des Fleurs de bonne volonté; partially cited by Beauvoir, 
1976, I: 306). Unlike Stendhal, Laforgue’s sympathies are harder to discern, his self-
caricature as a ‘bon misogyne’ (‘Préludes autobiographiques’, Les Complaintes; l. 16, OC, I: 
546-49) already signalling the sorts of paradoxes at work in his diagnosis of the female 
condition. But if the Laforguian female hardly provides Beauvoir with a positive touchstone, 
the poet’s (often caustic) account of the mystification of femininity is nevertheless harnessed 
to the ends of her own arguments. Beauvoir’s scattered allusions to Laforgue in her founding 
text of post-war French feminism are my starting point in this article for gauging the ways in 
which the poet’s diagnosis of the female condition might be reread. Just as this diagnosis was 
already rooted in many of the concerns, and terms, central to Beauvoir’s account, it was also 
underwritten by more radical ideals than it might appear, not least his call for fraternal 
relations between the sexes, which, as we shall see, was to capture Beauvoir’s imagination.  
 
 
Love, Sex, and Bad Faith 
 
Any approach to Laforgue’s writing on women has necessarily to pick its way through those 
strains of German pessimist philosophy with which his verse and notes are coloured. While 
Laforgue almost certainly never read Schopenhauer’s magnum opus, World as Will and 
Representation – the full French translation only appearing in 1886, and then in an edition of 
limited availability – he did have recourse to a range of secondary accounts of his philosophy, 
which had begun to appear in the 1870s, as well as to Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophie de 
l’Inconscient (1869; and translated into French in 1877), which Laforgue read in the winter of 
  
1880-81, and which would prove a continuous reference point for the poet in the years that 
followed.3 It is possible that Laforgue directly encountered Schopenhauer’s essay ‘On 
Women’ (1851) and his chapter on ‘The Metaphysics of Sexual Love’ (in the second volume 
of the 1844 expanded edition of World as Will and Representation) via Jean Bourdeau’s 
popular collection of translated extracts Pensées et fragments, which was first published in 
1881.4 But the thrust of Schopenhauer’s writing on women would, in any case, have been 
apparent from secondary sources, not least Hartmann’s own engagement with the 
‘Metaphysics of Sexual Love’ in his chapter, ‘L’Inconscient dans l’amour des sexes’.5 In his 
essay ‘On Women’, in particular, Schopenhauer voiced his outright misogyny with such 
venom that one imagines he had a particular axe to grind: in an emphatic statement of 
subordination that Beauvoir surely had in mind, these ‘thorough and incurable philistines’ are 
‘the inferior second sex in every respect’ (1970: 86).6 Not only have these ‘stunted, narrow-
shouldered, broad-hipped’ beings been wrongly designated the ‘fair sex’ (1970: 85), any 
beauty and charm to which women can lay claim are simply what he calls the ‘weapons she 
needs for securing her existence’ (1970: 81). As the very seat of the Will, woman finds her 
entire vocation in the propagation of the species; and it is this instinct that underwrites all 
affective experience. For ‘all amorousness’, Schopenhauer ventures, is ‘rooted in the sexual 
impulse alone’ (1966, II: 533).  
 On these grounds, the job of philosophical thought is to dispel ‘l’illusion amoureuse’ 
(Hartmann, 1877, I: 266) as part of the overarching law of what Hartmann termed the 
‘Unconscious’ (or ‘Inconscient’), the metaphysical principle governing existence – akin to 
Schopenhauer’s Will, but distinct insofar as it represents a teleological and intelligent 
process. We might like to think of our inclinations as ‘love’, but really it is the drive to satisfy 
our sexual impulse that, Hartmann says, ‘fait danser l’univers entier à sa corde de fous’ 
(1877, I: 255). The real trick of such emotion – or ‘le rôle pratique de ce sentiment’ (1877, I: 
  
268) – is to mask the instinctual mechanism of reproduction, to make us conform with the 
higher ends of the species. If Schopenhauer and Hartmann agree that love is a ruse, though, 
they differ in their diagnosis of the reproduction it is to ensure. Where the former envisages 
the renunciation of the reproductive drive as the only way out of an interminable cycle of 
suffering, for Hartmann, this drive is necessary for the evolution of the human race towards 
an advanced state of consciousness. Unlike Schopenhauer’s Will, the Hartmannian 
Unconscious is a form of intelligent design – ‘infaillible, omniscient et téléologique, suivant 
un plan qui se réalise dans l’histoire en évoluant sur la conscience pleine, le perfectionnement 
de l’espèce’ (Hannoosh, in Laforgue, OC, III: 1124). Importantly, Laforgue dismisses both 
Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s ethics. If he is sceptical of the latter’s optimism – ‘l’humanité 
n’arrivera jamais à la continence unanime qui serait sa libération, c’est un rêve’ (OC, III: 
1132) – he also rejects Schopenhauer’s recommendations of abstinence as impossible and 
obviously hypocritical: ‘la suppression du commerce sexuel dans l’humanité est un rêve, un 
motif à variations humoristiques dont ce farceur ne croyait pas un mot et pratiquait encore 
moins’ (OC, III: 1135). 
 Such a critical spirit of independence characterises his verse too; and if Laforgue 
takes up Schopenhauer’s vision of woman as the embodiment of the will-to-live (or, for 
Hartmann, of the Unconscious), it is largely with a heavy sense of humour. This beastlet in a 
bun appears as an unwitting figure of duplicity, hoodwinking man into marriage, and into 
bed: ‘Ô femme, mammifière à chignon, ô fétiche, | On t’absout; c’est un Dieu qui par tes 
yeux nous triche’ (‘Complainte des voix sous le figuier boudhique’, ll. 47-48, OC, I: 552-55). 
Laforgue’s relentless irony is directed at the codes of amorous discourse, which obscure what 
Hartmann describes unsentimentally as the procreative logic of the Unconscious: ‘Si A tombe 
amoureux de B, cela signifie que B est la moitié la plus propre à compléter A, ou que A 
engendrera avec B des enfants plus beaux qu’avec tout autre’ (Hartmann, 1877, I: 266). In 
  
‘Sur une défunte’ (Derniers vers; OC, II, 332-33), Laforgue takes Hartmann’s amorous 
algebra further into the alphabet as part of his reflection on the fundamental arbitrariness of 
the romantic encounter: 
 
Si elle avait rencontré seulement 
A, B, C, ou D, au lieu de Moi,  




Elle était née pour chacun d’eux. (ll. 8-10, 14) 
 
Here, the lover’s language of predestination is unhinged from romantic ideals of singularity, 
as each hypothetical romantic narrative cancels the other out in a potentially endless logic of 
substitutability: ‘Elle m’aime, infiniment! Non, d’occasion ! | Si non moi, ce serait infiniment 
un autre!’ (‘Complainte propitiatoire à l’Inconscient’, Les Complaintes; ll. 5-6, OC, I, 549; 
Laforgue’s emphasis). What Henri Scepi terms ‘les règles imposées de la grammaire des 
sentiments’ (2000: 230) fall under Laforgue’s scrutiny,  insofar as his own emphatic stress – 
the signposting of his citational mode – gives an ironic inflection to the lover’s capacity for 
‘infinite’ affection. 
 Laforgue’s disillusioned satire on the specious ideals peddled by the lover’s discourse 
operates under the aegis of Schopenhauer and Hartmann insofar as it serves to demystify the 
biological imperatives that determine ‘romantic’ relations. What the poet terms the drive of 
our ‘incurables organes’ (‘Dimanches’, Derniers vers, III; l. 48, OC, II: 307) establishes a 
fundamental struggle for self-gratification, and this produces in turn a pervasive hostility 
between the sexes, whose courting rituals are made to resemble a set-piece of modern 
warfare: ‘toilettés à la mode des passants’, men and women line up ‘en bataille rangée’ 
(‘Grande Complainte de la ville de Paris’, Les Complaintes; OC, I: 609). In the notes that 
Beauvoir cites at the head of her conclusion to Le Deuxième Sexe, Laforgue reproduces 
  
Schopenhauer’s assimilation of woman’s powers of seduction to a ‘weapon’, but it is one 
employed, he suggests, in an unfair war: 
 
Non, la femme n’est pas notre frère; par la paresse et la corruption, nous en avons fait 
un être à part, inconnu, n’ayant d’autre arme que son sexe, ce qui est non seulement la 
guerre perpétuelle, mais encore une arme pas de bonne guerre – […] des défiances 
d’éternel petit esclave. (OC, III: 1100; cited by Beauvoir, 1976, II: 633) 
 
Laforgue’s indictment of woman’s lack of solidarity is tempered by his recognition of man’s 
collective guilt; as Beauvoir glosses elsewhere, Laforgue ‘rend l’homme aussi coupable que 
la femme’ (1976, I: 306). Complicit in woman’s subordination or enslavement, man reaps 
what he sows, for if woman is forced to make a weapon of her sex, it is, Beauvoir elaborates, 
a spontaneous response to the situation in which she is placed: ‘elle cherche son salut dans la 
voie qui lui a été imposée, celle de la passivité’ (1976, II: 636). Where social and economic 
power is concentrated in the hands of men, women are bound to seek their survival via the 
acquired prestige of their relationship with them. What Laforgue gestures towards here is, 
then, precisely the social and historical conditioning contained in Beauvoir’s famous attack 
on essentialism: ‘on ne naît pas femme: on le devient’ (1976, II:13) – in Laforgue’s terms, 
‘nous en avons fait [de la femme] un être à part’ (OC, III: 1100).7  
 In tracing out these mutual concerns of philosopher and poet, I do not wish to argue 
that Beauvoir derives her feminist philosophy from Laforgue, but rather that she finds in him 
a particularly compelling voice for her claims, one already attuned to the difficult dynamics 
of intersubjectivity underpinning her own existentialist account of woman’s enslavement. In 
other words, Laforgue already describes the conditions of woman’s radical alterity (her status 
as ‘un être à part’), alert to the ways in which man establishes himself as a free subject by 
subjugating woman: in Beauvoir’s terms, ‘il est le Sujet, il est l’Absolu: elle est l’Autre’ 
(1976, I: 17). The subject can be posed only in being opposed by an other. That fundamental 
  
factor of woman’s concrete condition – what Beauvoir calls ‘son être-pour-les-hommes’ 
(1976, I: 235) – is precisely what Laforgue describes in Derniers vers, IX (‘Oh! qu’une 
d’elle-même’; OC, II: 328), from which the eighteen-year-old Beauvoir had copied out the 
following lines in her diary (see Beauvoir, 2008: 175): 
 
Et je sais parfaitement que ma destinée se borne  
(Oh, j’y suis déjà bien habituée!) 
À te suivre jusqu’à ce que tu te retournes, 
Et alors t’exprimer comment tu es! 
 
Vraiment je ne songe pas au reste; j’attendrai 
Dans l’attendrissement de ma vie faite exprès. (ll. 23-28) 
 
The Laforguian speaker expresses the female condition here in an act of ventriloquism that 
combines knowing irony with an ongoing complicity; the female voice is fully aware of, even 
accustomed to, the limits of her fate, that is, her preordained task of projecting man’s image 
of himself. Laforgue’s woman effectively inhabits the sphere of what Beauvoir calls 
‘immanence’, the realm of passivity and repetition that men compel women to occupy, and 
which is opposed to ‘transcendence’ – man’s reaching out into the future towards other freely 
chosen projects.8 Where woman’s transcendence is destined to be overshadowed, Beauvoir 
argues, by the transcendence of another ego that is sovereign, she risks denying her freedom 
of choice. Here the Laforguian female’s obedient submission to the male project of self-
creation bears out just such a sense of mauvaise foi: ‘j’attendrai | Dans l’attendrissement de 
ma vie faite exprès.’ Between the partially recapitulative ‘attendrai’ and ‘attendrissement’ – 
the future of patient passivity and the demonstration of undivided tenderness – Laforgue has 
his amoureuse obligingly set out the terms of her own emotional servitude.  
 Laforgue effectively describes, then, the structures of idealisation in which woman is 
imprisoned, and in which she is necessarily complicit. Indeed, it is this that Beauvoir remarks 
on in Laforgue’s writing: ‘dans toute son œuvre il exprime sa rancœur contre une 
  
mystification dont il rend l’homme aussi coupable que la femme’ (1976, I: 306). What Naomi 
Schor terms – with reference to Beauvoir’s philosophy – women’s ‘compensatory tendency 
to situate themselves on the side of the Ideal’ (1993: 32) is figured by Laforgue too as the 
strategy of the disenfranchised; woman’s refuge in a false ideal (‘Idéal sans vérité’) is the 
result of her being condemned to experience only ‘la facticité contingente de la vie’ 
(Beauvoir, 1976, I: 306 and II: 504). In ‘Pétition’ (Derniers vers; OC, II: 314), the Laforguian 
speaker wonders how these incarcerated angels of the hearth might be brought down from 
their high ground: 
 
Ô historiques esclaves! 
Oh! leur petite chambre! 
Qu’on peut les en faire descendre 
Vers d’autres étages, 
Vers les plus frelatées des caves, 




Mon Dieu, que l’Idéal 
La dépouillât de ce rôle d’ange! 
Qu’elle adoptât l’Homme comme égal! 
Oh, que ses yeux ne parlent plus d’Idéal, 
Mais simplement d’humains échanges (ll. 37-42, 49-53) 
 
The longed-for possibility of equality, of ‘humains échanges’, between the sexes depends on 
prising the female subject out of those angelic ‘ménages’ she inhabits – household chores in 
an emotional and material sense. Woman performs her celestial ‘role’ as part of her 
duplicitous enslavement to the Hartmannian Unconscious, for the Ideal that she deploys is, 
paradoxically, underwritten by the instinctual mechanisms of sexual reproduction, entirely 
complicit, even synonymous, with the procreative logic of Hartmann’s life-process. If the 
Laforguian female has truck with the ethereal, then, it only serves to bind her more tightly to 
the terrestrial world she inhabits. She remains mired in a state of Beauvoirian immanence, her 
  
desperate exclamation elsewhere – ‘Ô mois, ô linges, ô repas!’ (‘Complainte des pianos 
qu’on entend dans les quartiers aisés’, Les Complaintes; l. 60, OC: I, 558) – giving voice to a 
profound exasperation with the iterative cycles of femininity and domestic labour. 
It is, of course, this fundamentally repetitive anatomical female destiny that Beauvoir 
seizes on in Le Deuxième Sexe: ‘son malheur, c’est d’avoir été biologiquement vouée à 
répéter la Vie’ (1976: I, 116).9 In Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée (1958), meanwhile, 
Beauvoir’s autobiographical reflections on woman’s reproductive fate are captured precisely 
in a favourite Laforguian metaphor, the ritornello, which is associated first and foremost with 
his tormented female piano-player: ‘avoir des enfants, qui à leur tour auraient des enfants, 
c’était rabâcher à l’infini la même ennuyeuse ritournelle’ (1958: 185). As one of twelve 
children, Jules must have been acutely aware of the iterativity of the maternal fate; his 
mother’s death, following the birth of her twelfth child, is registered in the opening poem of 
Des Fleurs (‘Avertissement’): ‘J’avais presque pas connu ma mère’ (l. 3, OC, II: 147). Such 
anxieties about the stakes of consummation are played out in the novella, ‘Lohengrin, fils de 
Parsifal’ (Moralités légendaires), where Laforgue has his eponymous hero identify Elsa’s 
slim ‘anti-maternal’ hips as a sign of female duplicity; they fail to disclose, he says, the 
reproductive imperative that lies at the end of the line: ‘[tu marches] comme profitant de ta 
légèreté d’entr’acte, avant que ça recommence’ (OC, II: 427).10 The Laforguian male is bound 
to confront in his female counterpart the fact of his own eternally embodied fate, or what 






Laforgue’s diagnosis of woman’s circumscribed destiny wavers in such ways between 
expressions of sympathy and profound mistrust. But for all he returns to a Schopenhauerian 
vision of woman’s attachment to Nature, his writing also bears out, as in ‘Pétition’, a longing 
for change, a need – and in this he is closest to Beauvoir – to alter those prevailing structures 
of sexual relations that leave men and women estranged from one another. Indeed, there 
emerges across both Laforgue’s verse and notes the Beauvoirian fantasy of a new sort of 
intersubjectivity, which involves the mutual recognition of the other as a free acting subject. 
The interminable struggle of the individual consciousness for sovereignty through 
subordination – ‘l’implacable dialectique du maître et de l’esclave’ (1976: I, 241) – can be 
overcome, Beauvoir claims, ‘par la libre reconnaissance de chaque individu en l’autre, 
chacun posant à la fois soi et l’autre comme objet et comme sujet dans un mouvement 
réciproque’ (1976: I, 240). Fundamental to Laforgue’s own vision of transformed relations 
between the sexes is just such an ethics of reciprocity – or rather what he calls, with typical 
playfulness, sexciprocity: ‘tu es la femme, et moi l’homme[,] soyons heureux 
sexciproquement’ (OC, III: 1160). In one sense, the poet’s neologism bears out formally the 
faculty of invention that these new relations will require – and this in a way which already 
anticipates Beauvoir’s utopian ideal of reconfigured sexual and emotional relationships: 
‘entre les sexes naîtront de nouvelles relations charnelles et affectives dont nous n’avons pas 
idée’ (1976, II: 651). Indeed, Beauvoir specifically takes up Laforgue’s future-oriented vision 
in Le Deuxième Sexe, where she cites the poet’s injunction to his fellow men to establish 
women as equals rather than idols: ‘il faut […] en faire [des femmes] véritablement nos 
compagnes égales, nos amies intimes, des associées d’ici-bas, les habiller autrement, leur 
couper les cheveux, leur tout dire’ (OC, III: 1101; cited by Beauvoir, 1976, I: 405). If 
Laforgue’s ‘new woman’ – a sort of short-haired confidante! – is to exist, this depends, then, 
not only on man breaking with those structures of idealisation or mythification in which he 
  
holds her, but also on establishing a new relationship of honest intimacy – one which might 
look something like friendship. This, for Beauvoir, would represent the highest form of 
reciprocity to which we can aspire:  
 
l’amitié, la générosité, qui réalisent concrètement cette reconnaissance des libertés, ne 
sont pas des vertus faciles; elles sont assurément le plus haut accomplissement de 
l’homme, c’est par là qu’il se trouve dans sa vérité. (1976: I, 240) 
 
 For Laforgue, the lure of the heterosocial surfaces throughout his verse and notes as a 
way out of the false role-playing that underpins the rites of sexual and sentimental seduction. 
His eternally suspicious speaker is often led to reproduce Hartmann’s diagnosis of woman’s 
congenital inability to sustain genuine friendship; this ‘fausse sœur’ (‘Complainte des voix 
sous le figuier boudhique’, l. 55) could always be found guilty of peddling other agendas.11 
But Laforgue does fantasise of treating woman fraternally, and thus of a new model of 
partnership that might bring about the deflation of sexual difference. In notes that Beauvoir 
partially cites, Laforgue expresses his frustration with man’s unwillingness to treat woman as 
a working partner: 
 
La femme est un être vaillant, travailleur, un associé, etc. Nous ne devrions nous 
occuper d’elle autrement que de nos frères, qu’à certains moments, une 1/2 heure, parce 
qu’elle a un autre sexe, – pas avant, pas après – travail, association – Eh bien non, 
comme on l’a laissée dans l’esclavage, la paresse, sans autre occupation et arme que son 
sexe, elle l’a hypertrophié […]. Nous supportons tout le travail de la planète depuis 
l’histoire. Ce travail nécessairement est stupide et boite parce que la femme n’y prend 
pas part – avec la Femme nous avons jusqu’ici joué à la poupée – eh bien voilà trop 
longtemps que ça dure. (OC, III: 1105-06; partially cited by Beauvoir, 1976, I: 406) 
 
However tongue-in-cheek, the poet’s recommendation that man’s sexual impulse be sidelined 
to a notional daily half an hour is posed as a means of reasserting woman’s status as an agent. 
For where she has been condemned by man to idleness – that primary form of Beauvoirian 
immanence – woman has overdeveloped her only remaining occupation: ‘elle a hypertrophié 
  
[son sexe]’. Her claim to autonomy would, then, have to be worked out through her access to 
the (historical) labour process that Laforgue describes; she must become an ‘associée’ – 
man’s full co-worker in every domain, not least the intimate. Indeed, as Nick White puts it, 
with reference to Maupassant’s contemporaneous Bel-Ami (1885) – a novel Laforgue 
admired: ‘the language of association, with its political as well as financial overtones’ could 
be ‘transposed to the conjugal realm’ with some degree of idealism (2011: 384).12 Here 
White has in mind Madeleine Forestier’s view of marriage as a contract between equals – 
‘une association’ rather than ‘une chaîne’ (Maupassant, 2008: 208).  
If Maupassant registers the importance that discourses of ‘association’ acquired in the 
wake of the 1884 Loi Naquet, which reestablished divorce in France, the wider potential of 
such rhetoric continued to be exploited to political ends in much fin-de-siècle anarchist and 
socialist writing. In La Société mourante et l’anarchie (1893), Jean Grave took to task the 
subordination of married women in precisely these terms, ‘la femme ayant été jusqu’ici 
considérée comme inférieure, et plutôt comme une propriété que comme un associé’ (1893: 
72). Those of Laforgue’s notes on women (the above passage included) that were published 
posthumously by Félix Fénéon in the Revue anarchiste, and in the same year as Grave’s 
study, were set in this context of radical politics, however much the poet’s humour and 
evasiveness ultimately inhibit any sense of political engagement. In Laforgue’s hands, the 
vision of woman as an ‘associée’ seems, more precisely, to respond to the need to demystify 
and deidealise erotic relations. He imagines, in other words, introducing an easiness, or 
simplicity, into the heterosexual encounter, already hinted at in the opening lines of ‘Pétition’ 
– there under the guise of prostitution: ‘Avec toutes, l’amour s’échange | Simple et sans foi 
comme un bonjour’ (ll. 5-6). Elsewhere, it is, as we shall see below, the gesture of the 
handshake – a prime symbol of association – that comes to represent the straightforward 
commerce of sentimental and sexual relations about which the Laforguian speaker fantasises: 
  
‘Se serrer la main sans affaires! | Selon les cœurs, selon les corps’ (‘Célibat, célibat, tout n’est 
que célibat’, Des Fleurs; ll. 19-20, OC, II: 188).  
 Such moments of longing, however briefly glimpsed, hint at the form that Laforguian 
‘sexciprocity’ might take. Indeed, the mot-valise itself provides a particular meeting-point of 
the formal and the erotic, representing, as Laforgue put it, an impossible coupling of words: 
in a letter to Gustave Kahn (16 December 1884), he insisted on the erotic character of this 
word-play as ‘cet accouplement de mots qui n’ont qu’une harmonie de rêve mais font dans la 
réalité des couples impossibles’ (OC, II: 720). What binds two words together in such 
instances is, as Clive Scott puts it in the present issue, an ‘acoustic kinship’ or reciprocity; 
and this can be seen to extend to characterise Laforgue’s vers libre more widely, where 
‘rhyme has a psycho-associative rather than a structural value’. That such interest in 
fraternal, or associative, lexical relations might, as Scott registers, be connected to the poet’s 
reflections on relations between the sexes bears further reflection, not least insofar as it 
speaks to the alignment of the sexual and the formal already at work in many of Laforgue’s 
neologisms: ‘violuptés à vif’ (‘Complainte des nostalgies préhistoriques’, Les Complaintes; , 
l. 10, OC, I: 573), ‘vendanges sexciproques’ (‘Complainte à Notre-Dame des Soirs’, Les 
Complaintes; l. 18, OC, I: 551), ‘hontes sangsuelles’ (variant of l. 56, ‘Complainte des voix 
sous le figuier boudhique’)... As Henri Scepi and Jean-Pierre Bertrand argue, the Laforguian 
mot-valise – or to recall Laforgue’s terms, these ‘increvables membranes hymen’ (OC, II: 
720) – brings about a sexualised union of words that is strictly non-reproductive: 
‘l’accouplement ne donne pas naissance à un être constitué et viable; il rend manifeste un 
“rêve”, qui est l’envers de la langue’ (2012: 135). Or in Yvan Leclerc’s words, Laforgue 
produces ‘deux mots qui ne peuvent pas en faire un’ (1989: 34). Coupled but not synthetic, 
they open up instead a bracket – ‘une parenthèse’ (OC, II: 720) – that expands by a perpetual 
process of dédoublement.  
  
 If it is possible to align Laforgue’s formal innovation with his vision of sexual 
politics, it is, then, above all, in terms of an ongoing pursuit of new relationships, both sexual 
and semantic, that might be rooted in different kinds of compatibility. In Derniers vers, it is 
the figure of the ‘impossible couple’ – to transpose Laforgue’s account of his wordplay – that 
haunts the poet’s imagination. A utopian fantasy of symmetry and synchronicity between the 
sexes resurfaces throughout, whether as the tender image of collaborative communion – ‘Oh, 
simplement d’infinis échanges | A la fin de journées | A quatre bras moissonnées’ (‘Pétition’; 
ll. 57-59) – or as the imagined scenario of a simultaneous declaration, which Scepi terms ‘le 
thème de la coïncidence immédiate, “le tomber-ensemble-à-genoux”’ (2000: 248). Such 
prospects of a happy intersubjectivity give another inflection to the earlier leitmotiv of Les 
Complaintes: ‘Aimer, être aimé!’ (‘Complainte-Litanies de mon Sacré-Cœur’, l. 24, OC, I: 
612-13). But Laforgue is, as Scepi suggests, already mining away at these model images of 
reciprocity: ‘l’utopie de la fraternité amoureuse [...] fait l’objet d’un retournement ironique 
radical, qui équivaut à une négation sans appel’ (2000: 247). The Laforguian speaker’s ardent 
desire for absolute reciprocity in love only returns him to the ‘blocus sentimental’ (‘L’Hiver 
qui vient’, Derniers vers; l. 1, OC, II: 297) under which the collection unfolds: ‘Mais nul n’a 
voulu faire le premier pas | Voulant trop tomber ensemble à genoux’ (‘Solo de lune’, 
Derniers vers; ll. 14-15, OC, II: 320; Laforgue’s emphasis). Locked into another psychical 
struggle, the fantasy of synchronicity degenerates into a scene of hesitation that is destined to 
end in the regret of inaction – regret which is captured in that quintessentially Laforguian 
tense, the pluperfect subjunctive: ‘J’eusse été le modèle des époux. | Comme le frou-frou de 
ta robe est le modèle des frou-frou’ (ll. 106-07). Just as those gestures of reciprocal feeling 
always risk falling into the artful set-piece, so this husband manqué persists in fantasising of 
an inauthentic destiny, an accomplished form of role-play that would reduce him to the most 
frivolous synecdoche. Ultimately, the lure of bad faith hangs over Laforgue’s meditations on 
  
love, each amorous gesture threatening to harden into posture, to cement lovers in an 
estranged form of coupledom: ‘Des ans vont passer là-dessus, | On s’endurcira chacun pour 
soi’ (‘Solo de lune’; ll. 32-33). Before this future – at once feared and desired – the 
Laforguian speaker hesitates, and beats a retreat into self-irony. In turn, Laforgue’s utopian 
fantasy of an authentic sexual relationship is bound to implode.  
Such self-parody is drawn out at length in ‘Lohengrin, fils de Parsifal’, where the 
hero’s anxious hesitation on his wedding night not only precludes the awaited passage à 
l’acte, but also brings into view his own occasional feminist sympathies. For the novella’s 
hero is a self-styled crusader for the emancipation of women who nonetheless remains unable 
to escape his own Decadent idées reçues, ever suspicious of Elsa’s embodied desires. 
Postponing his feminist mission into the indefinite future, he ascends to the heights of the 
Schopenhauerian ‘Métaphysique de l’Amour’ with the following promise: ‘Parsifal, mon 
père, prépare un plan de rachat pour notre petite sœur humaine et si terre-à-terre!...’ (OC, II: 
428). The comically condescending voice of the male feminist betrays the kinds of 
difficulties involved in elaborating a project for woman’s redemption on her behalf; his own 
detachment, and the meditative freedom in which he takes refuge, become another form of 
self-deception. For what Laforgue parodies here – and in this he again anticipates Beauvoir – 
is not only the notion that man’s freedom can be conceived of independently from woman’s, 
but also the disavowal of man’s own complicity in her terrestrial fate. With Lohengrin’s 
abdication of his own responsibility – he leaves the work of feminism to his father –, 
Laforgue parodies the kind of ethical dégagement that elsewhere appears to undercut his own 
sympathies. In this respect, his vision of woman’s condition always operates at one remove 
from the committed ends to which Beauvoir chose to harness it. But however biting 
Laforgue’s humour, and however implosive his self-irony, his writing still bore out an 
egalitarian impulse that spoke to Beauvoir’s agendas. For both, as we have seen, the state of 
  
relations between the sexes is implicated in the widest ethical and philosophical questions 
about human freedom. And integral to both their utopian visions is the possibility of 
reciprocal intersubjectivity. At the end of the first volume of Le Deuxième Sexe, it is 
Laforgue’s call for fraternal relations that Beauvoir employs to articulate her own ardent 
wishes: ‘Ô jeunes filles, quand serez-vous nos frères, nos frères intimes sans arrière-pensée 
d’exploitation? quand nous donnerons-nous la vraie poignée de main?’ (1976, I: 408; see 
Laforgue, OC, III: 1100). The future of sexual politics was to rest on solidarity, epitomised by 
that most unsentimental (and quintessentially British) of exchanges, the handshake – and it is 





In a letter to Charles Henry of August 1882, Laforgue declared: ‘Vous savez qu’il y a trois 
sexes: l’homme, la femme, l’Anglaise’ (OC, I: 794). This third term in the gender binary – 
the English woman – was, he wrote elsewhere, the only ‘race de femme’ that he could not 
mentally undress (OC, III: 1116).14 Even before he met the diminutive English teacher, Leah 
Lee, whom he would eventually marry in December 1886, Laforgue had an English woman 
in mind as perhaps the only way out of an intolerable structure of sexual difference. ‘Le type 
de l’adorable, de l’aimée unique, pour moi est par ex. l’anglaise [...]’, he wrote, ‘Elle n’a pas 
pour moi d’organes sexuels, je n’y songe pas’ (OC, III: 960-61).15 As for Leah, this reserved, 
androgynous, short-haired ‘petit personnage’, as he liked to call her, seemed to body forth 
something of the fraternal companionship he had written about.16 But the prospect of 
marriage was a source of anxious deliberation. Jules had come close to asking Leah to marry 
him in spring that year; and though he got cold feet, wedlock seemed nonetheless inevitable: 
  
‘En tout cas je sens bien que le mariage est une question qui m’attend fatalement et que ce 
n’est plus qu’une affaire de temps’, he confided to his sister Marie (OC, II: 832). He 
eventually proposed to Leah one September evening, later describing the scene, again to his 
sister: 
 
Et avant-hier en la raccompagnant, je lui ai tout dit. Je ne lui ai pas dit “je vous aime”. 
Je lui ai balbutié des tas de choses que je ne me rappelle plus […]. Je lui ai demandé 
avec des tas de circonlocutions si elle voudrait passer sa vie avec moi (je me rappelle 
ma voix étranglée et mes larmes dans les yeux) et je ne lui ai pas donné le temps de me 
répondre, je me suis lancé dans des protestations. Elle a dit oui avec un regard 
extraordinaire. Je ne lui ai pas laissé dire qu’elle m’aimait mais qu’elle eût confiance en 
mon dévouement, etc., etc... Je ne me rappelle plus. Je la raccompagnai et nous nous 
donnâmes une solide poignée de main sans trop nous regarder en face. (OC, II: 873) 
 
Sealed with a handshake, this touching, if faintly awkward and understated, proposal self-
consciously maintains a critical distance from the language and gestures of romance; 
endlessly displaced by circumlocution, the definitive declaration of love is left unspoken, 
bracketed off as citation, just as it is in the opening line of ‘Dimanches’ (Derniers vers, III; 
OC, II: 306): ‘Bref, j’allais me donner d’un “Je vous aime”’... If Laforgue were to take the 
plunge of which his indecisive poetic persona remained incapable, it seemed this engagement 
would have to be established as a contract between equals, negotiated with honesty. But for 
the poet eternally suspicious of such commitments, marriage was a veritable test of his ethics. 
After proposing, he described his exhilaration in Hartmannian terms as a matter of 
collaborating with the Unconscious, ‘l’ivresse d’avoir obéi à l’Inconscient, à la volonté du 
destin’ (OC, II: 882).  
Like Laforgue, the eighteen year-old Beauvoir too felt marriage loomed, inevitably, at 
the end of the line, writing of her relationship with Jacques: ‘je sens que je ne peux pas 
résister, que je m’achemine fatalement vers ce terme... et j’aurais tant voulu m’attarder dans 
une imprécise affection’ (2008: 139). If she did not marry Jacques, she felt, she would not 
  
marry anybody (2008: 140) – and she remained, of course, true to her word. What she desired 
instead was to preserve ‘la grande douceur de l’amitié présente’ (2008: 139), a friendship 
captured in one Laforguian gesture – a handshake: ‘Penser que toute ma vie je trouverai aux 
heures dures une telle poignée de main…’ (2008: 219). If I have chosen to begin and end this 
article on a biographical note, it is because the line between Beauvoir and Laforgue travels 
via the intimate as much as the philosophical. We have seen how Laforgue’s account of the 
female condition prefigures the terms of Beauvoir’s existentialist thought, occasionally 
lending her the language in which to trace out her own feminist critique and aspirations. But 
Beauvoir’s reading of Laforgue was also, importantly, a personal one; and what she extracted 
from his writing inflected her own private dilemmas. What Laforgue described – and perhaps 
what moved Beauvoir in turn – was the difficulty of reconciling philosophy with the life of 
the emotions, or, in the terms of the poet’s dilemma, of knowing what illusions love entails 
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1 Later, in her autobiographical Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée (1958), Beauvoir recalled: ‘Sur les quais de la 
Seine, à travers mes sanglots, je me berçais avec des vers de Laforgue’ (303). 
2 The poet and essayist Robert Champigny determines in Laforgue’s writing many of the intellectual concerns, 
and much of the philosophical vocabulary, that Sartre would develop: ‘the existentialism of Laforgue is not 
latent; it is fully born and heralds, in its very terminology, the modern, non-religious existentialism whose best-
known representatives are Heidegger and Sartre’ (1952: 66). Champigny sees in Laforgue’s writing, however, a 
different ethical intervention to Sartre’s, an existentialism founded on the sort of ‘perpetual “dégagement”’ that 
the philosopher’s own future-bound ‘social ethics’ could not accommodate (73).  
3 For details of Laforgue’s philosophical reading, see Michèle Hannoosh in Laforgue, OC: III: 1123-26.  
4 Bourdeau’s collection, published by Félix Alcan, had already reached its sixteenth edition by the turn of the 
century.  
5 Laforgue refers explicitly to this chapter of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation in his novella 
‘Lohengrin, ou le fils de Parsifal’ of the Moralités légendaires (1887): ‘voici que l’oreiller, changé en cygne, 
éploya ses ailes impérieuses et, chevauché du jeune Lohengrin, s’enleva [...] vers les altitudes de la 
Métaphysique de l’Amour’ (OC, II: 428-29). Hartmann engages with Schopenhauer’s ‘Metaphysics of Sexual 
Love’ in part 2, chapter 2 (1877); and elsewhere, Schopenhauer’s views on women and sexual love are 
broached, for instance, by Caro (1878; chapter 4) and Challemel-Lacour (1870: 311-12). Caro writes that: ‘C’est 
à la passion de l’amour que le pessimisme fait la guerre la plus acharnée. On dirait que c’est le duel à mort entre 
Schopenhauer et les femmes qui sont les intermédiaires de l’insigne duperie dont l’homme est le jouet’ (1878: 
142). 
6 Beauvoir reproduces a selection of extracts from Schopenhauer in her adolescent diaries (see, for instance, 
2008: 339-41), and she refers to his vision of the Will in Le Deuxième Sexe (1976, I: 272). 
7 This is a point made in passing by Dottin-Orsini, but left undeveloped (see Laforgue, OC, III: 1073). 
8 In her Introduction to Le Deuxième Sexe, Beauvoir describes the latter in the following terms: ‘Tout sujet se 
pose concrètement à travers des projets comme une transcendance; [...] il n’y a d’autre justification de 
l’existence présente que son expansion vers un avenir indéfiniment ouvert’ (1976, I: 33). 
9 In Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée, Beauvoir reflected on the repetitive domestic chores that she imagined 
would define her future as a married woman: ‘chaque jour, le déjeuner, le dîner; chaque jour la vaisselle; ces 
heures indéfiniment recommencées et qui ne mènent nulle part: vivrais-je ainsi?’ (1958: 138). 
10 In her diary, Beauvoir noted: ‘Les Moralités légendaires m’ont parfois choquée et parfois ravie. Pas le temps, 
hélas! de les étudier de près. Je note que j’adore Pan et la Syrinx. J’aime bien Hamlet et Persée et Andromède, 
mais sans comparaison. Mais c’est un livre triste, triste, qui grimace souvent pour ne pas pleurer, ce qui est 
parfois affreux, parfois sublime’ (2008: 166). 
11 According to Hartmann, ‘les femmes en général sont incapables de toute pure et vraie amitié, aussi bien avec 
les hommes qu’entre elles’ (1877, I: 253).  
12 In a letter to Théophile Ysaÿe of July 1885, Laforgue declared his admiration for Maupassant’s fiction, 
however much he was suspicious of the author’s commercial success: ‘Je sais qu’en quatre ans je pourrais faire 
fortune si je voulais écrire des romans à la Guy de Maupassant. Bel-Ami est d’un maître, mais ce n’est pas de 
l’art pur’ (OC, II: 774). 
13 It is clear from Laforgue’s comment, in a letter to his sister Marie (8 September 1886), that he considered the 
handshake to be a characteristically English gesture: ‘[Leah] étudiait la peinture et peu à peu je lui ai apporté des 
gravures et puis des livres [...]. Tout cela très simplement, sans même la poignée de main si naturelle pourtant 
chez les Anglais’ (OC, II: 873). According to Herman Roodenburg, ‘To the French in the first half of the 
nineteenth century the handshake was something new, a gesture that recently had come across the Channel’ 
(1991: 177). That the handshake was still regarded in France, in the second half of the century, as an English 
custom is demonstrated by Emma Bovary’s response – cited by Roodenburg – to Léon’s farewell gesture: ‘A 
l’anglaise donc’. 
14 Leclerc describes the poet’s fascination with the gender-neutral anglaise as ‘la rencontre laforguienne d’un 
troisième sexe’ (1989: 35).  
15 Laforgue’s characterisation of the English woman as sexless was not wholly unusual. According to Robert 
and Isabelle Tombs, British women were characterized by the French as ‘unfeminine’, as well as ‘sincere, 
modest, religious, serious-minded and independent; and conversely, as naïve, prudish, unsociable, inelegant, 
indecorous and masculine’ (2006: 450). In the early decades of the nineteenth century, two French women 
writers characterised romantic relations between British men and women in a positive light. In De la littérature 
(1800), Madame de Staël described the domestic affection and harmony that she perceived across the Channel: 
‘les rapports des hommes avec les femmes se multiplient à l’infini par la sensibilité et la délicatesse’ (243). 
Meanwhile, in Olivier ou le Secret (written between 1821-23; published in 1971), Madame de Duras has the 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Comte de Sancerre describe, from England, the domestic lot of women and their status as companions, and 
friends: ‘Nulle part les femmes ne sont plus heureuses, car nulle part elles ne sont mieux aimées, [...] une femme 
est la compagne, l’amie qu’on a choisie pour s’aider à supporter les maux de la vie’ (2007: 200). I am grateful to 
Stacie Allen for drawing my attention to these connections. 
16 See, for instance, Laforgue’s letter to his sister Marie, written 8 September 1886: ‘C’est un petit personnage 
impossible à décrire. Elle est grande comme toi et comme moi, mais très maigre et très anglaise surtout’ (OC, II: 
874). 
